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Abstract
This paper discusses a model of the civil aviation reg-
ulation framework and shows how the current assess-
ment of reliability and risk for piloted aircraft has a
limited applicability for Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UAS) as technology moves towards higher levels of
autonomous decision making. Then, a new frame-
work for risk management of robust autonomy is pro-
posed, which arises from combining quantified mea-
sures of risk with normative decision making. The
term Robust Autonomy describes the ability of an au-
tonomous system to either continue or abort its oper-
ation whilst not breaching a minimum level of accept-
able safety in the presence of anomalous conditions.
The term combines reliability, safety, and robust-
ness. The decision making associated with risk man-
agement requires quantifying probabilities associated
with the measures of risk and also consequences of
outcomes related to the behaviour of autonomy. The
probabilities are computed from an assessment under
both nominal and anomalous scenarios described by
faults, which can be associated with the aircraft’s ac-
tuators, sensors, communication link, changes in dy-
namics, and the presence of other aircraft in the op-
erational space. The consequences of outcomes are
characterised by a loss function quantifies the desir-
ability of the outcomes.
Keywords: Robust Autonomy, Unmanned Aircraft
Systems, UAS, Regulation, Certification, Bayesian
Reliability
1 Introduction
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) are a rapidly
growing sector of the civil aviation industry. A key
challenge facing this emerging sector is the lack of
a regulatory framework, either prescriptive, perfor-
mance or goal based, that can provide assurance in
the safety of UAS operations. This framework must
account for the varying Levels of Autonomy (LoA) in
UAS.
There is an increasing demand for higher LoA
in UAS. This demand largely stems from the need
to lower the operational cost of UAS by reducing
the number of people required to operate the sys-
tem and to reduce the need for continuous commu-
nication links. The role of the human Remote Pilot
(RP) in the operation of the UAS depends on the
LoA of the system. The higher the LoA, the more
the UAS subsumes the role (i.e., functions) of the
human RP (Clothier & Walker 2013). Thus, as the
LoA increases so does the complexity of the UAS
and the higher the degree of safety assurance that
must be demonstrated by the components of the UAS.
This creates a new and challenging paradigm for Na-
tional Airworthiness Authorities (NAAs) responsible
for managing the safety of the civil UAS industry.
One of the first steps in the safety management
process is the establishment of stakeholder goals in re-
lation to the safety performance of the system. A risk
assessment is then undertaken to estimate the safety
performance of the system. The risk estimates are
then compared against the goals to determine which
of the identified hazardous scenarios require mitiga-
tion and control. In a civil aviation safety manage-
ment context, the mechanisms put in place to reduce
(mitigate and control) the identified risks establish
the framework of regulations, standards and proce-
dures relating to
1. design, manufacture, maintenance, and opera-
tion of the aircraft (i.e., UAS),
2. training and licensing of personnel, and the
3. responsibilities of the organisation.
Compliance with this framework provides a degree
of assurance or confidence in the safety performance
of the system. Accidents involving civil aviation air-
craft are nowadays extremely rare events. Subse-
quently, significant operational experience is needed
before estimates of the actual safety performance of
the regulated system can be determined with a rea-
sonable degree of confidence.
Differences between the Conventionally Piloted
Aircraft (CPA) and UAS safety paradigms will in-
fluence how the safety risks associated with the op-
eration of the two technologies can be most effec-
tively managed. Researchers have explored a num-
ber of different components of the safety risk man-
agement process and its application to UAS. A num-
ber of factors that can give rise to differences in the
specification of safety goals for CPA and UAS are pre-
sented in Clothier & Walker (2013). Issues specific
to the evaluation risks associated with UAS are ex-
plored in Clothier, Williams, Fulton & Lin (2013). An
overview of the safety risk management process and
some of the issues specific to its application to UAS
can be found in Clothier & Walker (2013).
The default position of NAAs is to seek to ap-
ply and adapt the existing CPA framework of regu-
lations to UAS (Clothier et al. 2011). It has been
argued that the existing regulations may not provide
for an effective management of the risks for UAS due
to the differences between the CPA and UAS safety
risk paradigms (Hayhurst et al. 2006, Clothier et al.
2011, Clothier & Wu 2012). One of the most signif-
icant differences between the two paradigms is that
the primary risks associated with UAS operations are
to people external to the system (i.e., third parties
on the ground or secondary parties onboard other
aircraft). Conversely, the primary risks associated
with CPA operations are to people onboard the air-
craft (Clothier & Walker 2013). Another difference,
and the principle subject of this paper, is in the inte-
gral contribution of the “human element” to the safe
operation of the system.
For UAS, many of the functions that once were
performed by a human pilot are now provided by
hardware and software systems. The application of
the existing CPA framework of regulations and stan-
dards may not account for differences in the allocation
of functions to hardware, software and “human” com-
ponents of an UAS. The allocation of functions will
also depend on the LoA of the UAS1. Hayhurst et al.
(2006) states that
“It is not clear, however, whether existing
regulations that are based on a historical
pairing of pilot and plane can be adapted to
accommodate UASs, or whether UASs con-
stitute a fundamentally different category of
aircraft requiring their own set of regula-
tions.”
This issue is further explored in this paper. In or-
der to satisfy the safety performance objectives estab-
lished for UAS, safety assurance is required at higher
‘levels’ within the aviation safety system. New tools
for providing assurance in the safety of autonomous
aviation systems are needed. These tools must be ca-
pable of assessing the safety of the autonomous sys-
tem under a wide range of operating conditions, mis-
sions and failure scenarios.
The rest of the paper discusses the current safety
assurance framework and then proposed a new frame-
work for risk management of UAS with increased lev-
els of autonomy.
2 The Safety Assurance Framework
Figure 1 depicts a hierarchical model of the aviation
safety system. This model describes different levels
of organisational complexity of the aviation system.
The focus of this section is on describing the different
mechanisms for providing assurance in the safety at
the level of Operations and below.
The Operators component describes the frame-
work of organisational policies, procedures and re-
sources in which Scenarios are conducted. A Scenario
encompasses the interaction of the components of Air-
craft, Mission, and Weather. While the Airspace Sys-
tem (which includes the various Classes of Airspace
1A review of different frameworks for describing levels of auton-
omy is provided by Clothier, Perez and Williams (Clothier, Perez
& B. Williams 2013)
and the Air Traffic Management (ATM) services pro-
vided) is determined at a level higher than Scenar-
ios the Airspace Requirements, which draws on the
specifics from the Airspace System, is determined by
the Mission. The organisational environment is a
significant factor in the safety of aviation activities.
However, further consideration of the Operators com-
ponent is beyond the scope of this paper.
The lower tiers of the model are inspired by the
SHEL Model (Edwards 1972). Where, ‘S’ stands for
the software, ‘H’ for the hardware, and ‘L’ for the
liveware (or human) components of an Aircraft and
‘E’ for the aircraft environment (referred to as the
component of Weather in Figure 1). The component
of Liveware represents the interaction of a team of In-
dividuals performing a range of Roles. The behaviour
of a Machine emerges from the interaction of both
of its components of Hardware and Software, and the
behaviour of the Aircraft, through the interaction of
the components of Machine and Liveware, for given
Missions and Weather conditions.
The existing framework of regulations for CPA and
its relationship to the components of the model illus-
trated in Figure 1 is discussed in the following section.
2.1 Safety Assurance for CPA
Historical aviation accident and incident data can be
used to provide estimates of the actual safety per-
formance of CPA at the system levels of Operations
and Scenario. The observed “safety performance”
is largely due to the safety assurance provided by a
framework of regulations, standards and procedures
governing different components of CPA Operations.
The regulatory framework for CPA separates regula-
tions pertaining to the initial and continuing airwor-
thiness of the system (e.g., requirements on the de-
sign, manufacture and maintenance of the Machine)
from those regulations pertaining to the operation
(i.e., independent of the Mission and Weather), and
from the training, licensing, and proficiency of the
aircrew (i.e., the component of Liveware). Each com-
ponent of the regulation can be thought of as having
a ‘contribution’ to the overall safety performance of
CPA Operations. The separate contributions are il-
lustrated in Figure 2. It is important to note that
in reality the safety performance of CPA Operations
cannot be reduced to discrete contributions. Safety
performance is an emergent property, specifically, an
irreducible property and one “which is not determined
solely from the properties of the system’s parts, but
which is additionally determined from the system’s
structure and behaviour” (Thome´ 1993). However,
for the purposes of providing a simple illustration for
discussion it is represented as an “aggregate” rela-
tionship.
For CPA, the primary entities at risk are the
crew and passengers onboard the aircraft (Clothier
& Walker 2013). Consequently, CPA regulations im-
plicitly aim to limit or eliminate harm to those aboard
the aircraft, and secondarily to those over-flown (Hay-
hurst et al. 2006). This philosophy is reflected in the
framework of initial and ongoing airworthiness reg-
ulations, which govern the design, manufacture and
maintenance of a CPA. As described by Haddon &
Whittaker (2002), as far as is practicable, the airwor-
thiness codes of regulatory requirements avoid any
presumption of the purposes for which the aircraft
will be used in service. Referring to Figure 1, the air-
worthiness regulations provide safety assurance be-
low the level of the Aircraft at the component of
the Machine (i.e., largely independent of the com-
ponents of Mission and Weather). The airworthiness
Figure 1: A model of the civil aviation regulation framework.
Figure 2: Comparison of Contributions to Safety Performance of CPA and UAS Operations.
regulations are specific to the component of the Ma-
chine. Compliance to these regulations and standards
is recognised through the issuing of a Type Certifi-
cate and Certificates of Airworthiness—see, for ex-
ample, CASA (2000). The airworthiness regulations
and standards contribute to a proportion of the over-
all safety performance of CPA Operations, labelled as
region ‘A’ in Figure 2. It should be highlighted that
while an Aircraft design (formalised by the Type Cer-
tificate) will limit the types of Mission and Weather
in which operations can take place there is no certifi-
cation requirement at the level of Scenarios. There is
a consideration of suitability conducted at the Oper-
ations level, including continuation training require-
ments.
CPA airworthiness regulations are defined largely
independent of the human component of an air-
craft system (the component of Liveware). Whilst
standards for human-machine interface and handling
qualities are defined, the airworthiness standards are
implicitly defined based on the assumption of a “nom-
inal pilot”. Separate regulations and standards per-
taining to the training, licensing and currency of air-
crew provide safety assurance in the component of
Liveware. Aircrew are trained to operate safely a
particular type of aircraft under a wide range of nor-
mal and abnormal operating conditions, missions and
emergency scenarios. The proficiency of the crew
in performing these functions is provided through
training, examination and through demonstration by
means of a flying test(s). Satisfactory performance
results in the issuing of a licence. Training and li-
censing of Liveware contributes to a proportion of
the overall safety performance of CPA Operations.
This contribution is represented as region ‘B ’ in Fig-
ure 2. It is important to note that the performance of
the Liveware can be highly varied and unpredictable.
The issuing of a pilot licence provides no guaran-
tee that all pilots will perform as trained. Subse-
quently, the contribution of a trained pilot to the
overall safety performance of the system can vary sig-
nificantly (i.e., the region ’B ’ is highly dependent on
the individual). Continuation training, performance
and currency monitoring is undertaken at the Opera-
tions level.
There is an additional contribution to the overall
safety performance of CPA Operations, which arises
from the ability of the pilot (Liveware) to handle un-
desired, emergent and unforeseen scenarios that arise
due to failures in, or interactions between, the sub-
components of the Aircraft, or due to the interaction
of the Aircraft, Mission and Weather. This contri-
bution can be viewed as a “Guardian Angel” func-
tion. Examples of where the Liveware has success-
fully adapted to accommodate such undesired scenar-
ios would include Air Canada Flight 142, known as
the “Gimli Glider” (Williams 2003). As the Gimli
Glider example highlights, there is an additional con-
tribution made by the Liveware to the overall safety
performance of CPA operations. (illustrated as re-
gion ‘C ’ in Figure 2). It is important to note that
the component of Liveware is not infallible nor can
it handle all foreseeable scenarios. As CPA accident
data would attest, the component of Liveware can be
both a mitigator and significant contributor towards
CPA accidents. Thus, the region ‘C ’ represents the
net contribution of all pilots to the safety performance
of CPA Operations. Hypothetically, if safety perfor-
mance could be measured down to the level of individ-
ual pilots, then for some pilots the net contribution
could be negative.
A significant contributor to the safety performance
of CPA is provided by the Liveware. This contribu-
tion is not due to the safety assurance provided by
the existing regulations and standards. This is be-
cause the regulatory framework for CPA only pro-
vides safety assurance with respect to the individual
components of the Aircraft (e.g., the separate compo-
nents of Machine and Liveware) and not with respect
to the system as a “whole”. The question of interest
in this paper, is whether the same framework of reg-
ulations for CPA would result in the same degree of
safety performance if applied to UAS. Of particular
interest are those UAS which exhibit a high LoA (i.e.,
where the role of the human in the operation of the
UAS is significantly reduced).
2.2 Application to UAS
The high-level safety objective for UAS is that they
demonstrate, as a minimum, a level of safety per-
formance equivalent to that currently demonstrated
by CPA. This objective is commonly referred to as
Equivalent Level of Safety (ELoS). A summary of
qualitative and quantitative statements of the ELoS
objective is discussed by Clothier & Walker (2013).
We can establish the “goal” safety performance for
UAS with reference to the “measured or observed”
safety performance for CPA, as illustrated in Figure 2.
The primary risks associated with the operation of
CPA are to those onboard the aircraft (first parties).
Whereas for UAS, the primary risks are to those
people onboard other aircraft (secondary parties) or
to those on the ground (third parties) (Clothier &
Walker 2013). The ELoS objective for UAS must
therefore be determined in relation to the risks CPA
pose to second and third parties.
With reference to the hierarchical model presented
in Figure 1, the ELoS objective can be defined at the
component of the UAS Operation. Regulations on
other components of the aviation safety system (e.g.,
Operators) will contribute to the overall safety perfor-
mance of the system (illustrated by Regions ‘D ’ and
‘H ’ in Figure 2). Discussion in this paper is focusses
on the safety-contributions provided by the regula-
tions on the components of the Aircraft. Thus, the
comparison being made in this section assumes the
components of Mission and Weather are constant.2
The application of the existing framework of regu-
lations and standards governing the airworthiness of
UAS will have a hypothetical contribution to the over-
all safety performance exhibited by UAS Operations
(illustrated as region‘E ’ in Figure 2). Similarly, train-
ing and licensing of the human RP will also provide a
degree of assurance in the safety performance of UAS
operations (illustrated as region ‘F ’). Similar to the
pilot of a CPA, the presence of a human RP can also
provide a degree of “robustness” to the UAS opera-
tion, which contributes to the overall safety perfor-
mance of the UAS (illustrated as region ‘G ’). These
contributions (‘E ’, ‘F ’ and ‘G ’) will depend on the
LoA of the UAS. The higher the LoA of the UAS, the
less the human RP is involved in the operation of the
UAS and the more the UAS subsumes the role (i.e.,
functions) of the RP (Clothier & Walker 2013). It
follows that as the LoA increases, the more functions
are required to be performed by the Machine.
2It is important to note that applying CPA regulations to UAS
(at the level of the Machine) will not account for potential differ-
ences in the nature of the typical Missions performed by UAS or
differences in the typical environments (Weather) in which UAS
are operated. For example, High Altitude Long Endurance UAS
or UAS operating at low levels in urban environments. (Clothier
& Wu 2012) illustrates how the application of existing CPA sys-
tem reliability requirements to UAS can, in some cases, lead to an
unacceptable level of risk at the level of an UAS Operation.
Consider an UAS with a LoA where the RP per-
forms the exact same functions as a human pilot of
a CPA, with the only difference being that the RP is
remotely located from the Unmanned Aircraft (UA).
Despite the ‘functions’ performed by the RP and con-
ventional pilot being the same, their relative contri-
bution to the safety performance of their respective
operations will not be the same. This difference in
safety performance is a result of the limited experi-
ence in the operation of UAS in civil airspace and as
a consequence the training and licensing of RPs may
not provide the same degree of safety assurance as
that typically provided by the training and licensing
of pilots of CPA. There are also human performance
considerations unique to UAS (Fothergill et al. 2013)
that will impact on the net contribution of the Live-
ware to the overall safety performance of an UAS Op-
eration. For example, psychological differences (e.g.,
trust in autonomy, the lack of “pilot shared fate” with
the UA), and differences in RP situational awareness,
etc. In sum, even if UAS exhibited the same degree
of reliability in the Machine and the functions per-
formed by the Liveware were the same, the relative
contributions and the overall safety performance ex-
hibited is likely to be different for UAS compared to
CPA.
Now consider the other extreme, where an UAS
has a LoA where the human RP no longer has a role in
the flight of the UAS. All of the functions of the Live-
ware are now provided by the component of Machine.
The safety-contributions previously provided by the
Liveware (i.e., ‘F ’ and ‘G ’) must now be provided by
the Machine. Existing software and hardware stan-
dard can provide a degree of safety assurance in the
Machine for those functions for which RP are trained
(i.e., ‘F ’). However, the existing safety contribution
due to the adaptability of the RP (i.e., region ‘G’)
would not be assured. Specifically, can the functions
previously provided by Liveware and now provided
by the Machine still be adequately performed in the
presence of failures in the Machine or under unfore-
seen conditions?
To answer this question, safety assurance must be
provided at the component-level of the UAS Scenar-
ios in addition to the existing safety assurance mech-
anisms for the components of Software and Hardware.
New certification tools are needed that can assess the
UAS Scenarios as a “whole” under varying missions,
environmental conditions and failures. The next sec-
tion (Section 3) describes one possible tool that can
be used to provide such a certification assessment.
2.3 Implications for CPA
The discussion of Safety Assurance for CPA reflects
current practice. It is important to note that the dis-
cussion based on UAS are not limited in applicability
to UAS, and it is highly likely that as safety assurance
is studied from a UAS context that it will influence
and update thinking and practices in CPA.
3 A Proposed Framework for UAS Robust
Autonomy Certification
The management of risk of UAS requires quantify-
ing both uncertainty and consequences of outcomes,
where the latter refers to behaviour of the system as a
whole. While CPA operations may be conducted un-
der similar uncertainty, the previously discussed abil-
ities of the Liveware has been the basis for accept-
able safety and performance. In UAS, these decisions
under uncertainty have shifted from Liveware to Ma-
chine, or some combination of both. The uncertainty
is related to three characteristics:
• the actual environmental conditions that the
UAS will encounter during the missions (weather
and complexity of the operational airspace),
• the reliability of the different components and
subsystems of the UAS (airworthiness), and
• the ability of the autonomy to make the ratio-
nal decisions regarding guidance, navigation and
motion control in both normal and anomalous
conditions (robust decision making).
All these characteristics are encapsulated in the term
Robust Autonomy, which describes the ability of an
autonomous system to either continue or abort its
operation whilst not breaching a minimum level of
acceptable safety in the presence of anomalous con-
ditions (Perez et al. 2011b, Perez & Williams 2012,
Perez et al. 2011b). Robust autonomy encompasses
both safety and reliability. In addition, the qualifier
“robust” highlights the feature that the autonomous
operation is being considered under both normal and
anomalous conditions.
In the absence of a regulatory framework for the
certification of highly autonomous UAS, we propose
a process based on six steps:
1. Adopt a set of missions for which a UAS is being
certified.
2. Adopt the relevant measures of safety and per-
formance and their associated sets of acceptable
level.
3. Adopt the envelope of operational conditions
within which the missions must be performed.
4. Conduct an evaluation of autonomy to compute
probabilities of maintaining acceptable safety
and performance.
5. Present a certification case to the NAA.
6. NAA makes a certification decision according to
the probabilities and levels of risk deemed ac-
ceptable.
The outcomes of Steps 1 to 3 should be a clear set
of requirements for particular missions and classes of
UAS deemed appropriate for these missions. For ex-
ample, UAS operations for bush fire monitoring, sea
search and rescue, and traffic monitoring over popu-
lated areas may all have different requirements and
envelopes of weather and environments in which they
are allowed to operate. In addition the characteristics
of the mission may also have a bearing on the required
sensor and actuator physical redundancy. Step 4 re-
quires a probabilistic assessment of safety and per-
formance, which takes into account the reliability of
the Machine (e.g., the airframe, sensors, and actu-
ators), the likelihood of the operational conditions
(e.g., weather, faults, failures, and complexity of the
space in which the mission is conducted), and the ca-
pabilities of the autonomy to make rational decisions
in regard to mission execution, guidance, navigation,
communication, and motion control (the equivalent
of the Liveware in the CPA). Step 4 is expected to
be conducted by third-party testing organisation us-
ing methods and tools approved by the NAA. Step 5
involves the operator seeking certification to gather
information to put a case forward for the NAA. This
will include a certificate from third-party testing or-
ganisation. Step 6 involves the decision making by the
NAA about certification, which requires the quantifi-
cation of the consequences of the potential outcomes
as perceived by the NAA.
The development of steps 1 to 5 above are to be
addressed in collaboration with the NAA. In the fol-
lowing, we discuss specific aspects of each of the steps
of the proposed framework above.
3.1 Step 1 - Classification of UAS Missions
UAS are designed for specific operations and envi-
ronments under which the operations need to be con-
ducted. The objective of Step 1 is to agree with the
NAA on a classification of UAS type and its asso-
ciates class of missions. The class may be related
to operations such as search and rescue at sea, bush
fire monitoring, border patrol, mineral exploration,
etc. The classes can be defined by attributes such as
mass, sensor redundancy, actuator redundancy, limits
on the envelope of environmental conditions for which
operations can be conducted, whether operations are
to be conducted over populous or non-populous areas,
and whether the operations are to be conducted in
operational spaces of limited complexity (segregated
airspace). Once the classes are defined, the measures
of safety and performance associated with each class
needs to be determined in Step 2.
3.2 Step 2 - Safety and Performance Indica-
tors
UAS within a particular class should be able to con-
duct specific operations or missions in prescribed en-
vironments. The measures of safety and performance
can be evaluated in terms of performance indices ri
(i = 1, 2, ..., l) related to safety requirements of the
operation and perhaps also performance attributes
that can impact on safety. For example, indices re-
lated to safety include separation between aircraft, lo-
cation with respect to no-fly zones, ability to declare
and communicate emergencies, ability to re-route af-
ter declaring emergencies, ability to detect and ac-
commodate certain faults, detect and avoid, kinetic
energy on emergency landing, etc. Performance at-
tributes with bearing on safety are related to the
particular aircraft flight envelope. Hence, climb rate,
bank angle, loading factor, airspeed, and angle of at-
tack, may be considered in relation to a flight enve-
lope. The adage “Aviate, Navigate, Communicate”
can assist in identifying measures of safety and per-
formance, as well as providing a prioritised ordering.
For each quantifiable performance index ri (i =
1, 2, ..., l), we can associate a set Ri, such that sat-
isfactory performance is attained whenever the value
of the index is in the set for the complete mission,
namely ri ∈ Ri. Then, we can define the Event of
Satisfactory Performance as such in which a perfor-
mance index remains inside its region of satisfactory
performance for the complete mission:
Si = {ri ∈ Ri}, i = 1, 2, ..., l. (1)
These events are a logical statement or hypotheses
which once a mission is tested can either be true or
false.
3.3 Step 3 - Envelope of Operational Condi-
tions
The missions for which the aircraft is being certified
are to be conducted under an envelope of operational
conditions which encompass weather, aircraft health,
and complexity of the airspace. The uncertainty as
to which weather condition Wj (j = 1, 2, ...,m) can
occur during the mission can be described by the
probability distribution P (Wj |I), where I represents
background information. These probabilities can be
estimated from meteorological data for a particular
geographical location and time of the year. Note that
the weather conditions to be considered for the oper-
ation of the UAS may depend on the type of mission.
For example, an UAS used for bush fire monitoring
is expected to operate in potentially turbulent high
windconditions, whereas a UAS used for aerial spray-
ing of crops may be certified only for operation in
light wind conditions.
The UAS may also be subjected to faults, Fk(k =
0, 1, ..., n), which can be associated with the aircraft’s
actuators, sensors, communication link, changes in
dynamics, and the presence of other aircraft in the
operational airspace. The condition F0 denotes the
faultless or nominal case (healthy platform operating
in anticipated airspace complexity). The uncertainty
as to which fault may occur during the mission is de-
scribed by the probability distribution P (Fk|I). If a
fault is associated with a component or a subsystem,
for example a servo for a control surface, then P (Fk|I)
can be computed from the failure rate function of the
component or system (Singpurwalla 2006, Hamada
et al. 2010). Faults associated with the complexity of
the operational space, P (Fk|I) can be computed from
air traffic data or other background information.
3.4 Step 4 - Probabilistic Assessment of
Safety and Performance
The work by Perez et al. (2011b,a) provides a proba-
bilistic assessment of robust autonomy in terms of be-
haviours. This is motivated by the fact that when pi-
lots are evaluated, it is their behaviour in specific situ-
ations which is being assessed rather than their neuro-
physiological process that leads to the behaviour. A
similar procedure can be followed for assessing the ra-
tionality of decision making of the autonomy, in which
the evaluation is done without specific knowledge of
the implementation of autonomous decision making.
The potential to evaluate the performance of the au-
tonomy of the Machine under failure is critical to pro-
viding assurance in the robustness of the UAS (i.e.,
the additional contribution ‘G ’ in Figure 2.)
The performance during the mission can then be
assessed in terms of the predicted probabilities of the
events of satisfactory performance Si as defined in
Step 2 (Perez et al. 2011a). The hardware that im-
plements the autonomous decisions can be connected
to a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) simulator and tested
under the selected set of weather and operational con-
ditions (Step 3). The data, D, collected during a
HIL test consists of aircraft motion, location, and also
information exchanged over available communication
channels. These data can be used to compute the
predicted distribution P (Si|D, I). These probabili-
ties are called Measures of Robust Autonomy (Perez
et al. 2011b) and can be computed via marginalisa-
tion:
P (Si|D, I) =∑
j
∑
k
P (Si|Wj , Fk, D)P (Wj |I)P (Fk|I). (2)
Each of these measures involves different aspects of
the system which contributes to its total reliabil-
ity and in turn the overall safety performance of
the UAS operation. The distributions P (Wj |I) and
P (Fk|I) capture uncertainty about the environment
in which the system is to operate. The distribu-
tion P (Si|Wj , Fk, D), (i = 1 : l) evaluates the quality
of autonomous decision making of the UAS under a
particular scenario given by the combination Wj , Fk.
The latter encompasses aspects of robustness and per-
formance of the vehicle control system, fault detection
and diagnosis system, and on-line decisions about re-
configuration of the control system and mission re-
routing and trajectory planning.
The distribution P (Si|Wj , Fk, D) in (2) is related
to the concept of coverage discussed by Wu (2004),
that is, the probability of maintaining a desired level
of performance and safety given that a particular sce-
nario has occurred. In the context of this paper, cov-
erage encompasses not only the low-level motion con-
troller but, depending on the degree of autonomy of
the platform, also the guidance, communications and
navigation systems.
Note that the distribution P (Si|Wj , Fk, D) is re-
lated to the level Mission in Figure 1 since the risk
measures or performance indices are defined for a set
of operations or missions as discussed in Step 2. Also,
the weather P (Wj |I) and fault P (Fk|I) distributions
are related to the levels of Aircraft and Weather in
Figure 1. Therefore, the measures of robust auton-
omy P (Si|D, I) in (2) relate to the level Scenarios in
Figure 1.
Since the events Si, defined in (1), are proper hy-
potheses about the system’s behaviour, which can
either be true or false, the probability of obtaining
a number of successes in a certain number of mis-
sions can be modelled using the Bernoulli distribution
where pii is a parameter that that gives the probabil-
ity of success in one mission. If we collect data D
from N replications of evaluation of performance us-
ing a hardware-in-the-loop simulator, we can update
our prior p(pi|I) to the posterior
p(pii|D, Ijk) = p(D|pii, Ijk)p(pii|I)∫
p(D|pii, Ijk)p(pii|I) dpii , (3)
where, Ijk = {Wj , Fk, I} represents the informa-
tion related to the particular condition being tested.
The posterior densities p(pii|D, Ijk) encode our uncer-
tainty on the value of pii under the condition Wj , Fk.
From the posterior p(pii|D, Ijk), we can obtain the
coverage probabilities P (Si|D,Wk, Fk, I) as predicted
probabilities for the success in a single mission (Perez
et al. 2011a):
P (Si|D,Wk, Fk, I) =
∫ 1
0
pii p(pii|D, Ijk) dpii. (4)
In some cases, it may be convenient to have a sin-
gle figure of merit for robust autonomy. The natural
procedure to obtain this figure would be to evaluate
the probability that all the indices are jointly within
their regions of acceptable performance, namely,
P (S1, . . . , Sl|D, I) (5)
=
∑
j
∑
k
P (S1, . . . , Sl,Wj , Fk|D, I)
=
∑
j
∑
k
P (S1, . . . , Sl|Wj , Fk, D)P (Wj |I)P (Fk|I).
Details of these computations including a discussion
on the choice of prior in (3) according to the principle
of maximum entropy can be found in (Perez et al.
2011a).
If some indices are not within their region of ac-
ceptable performance then it would be expected that
they degrade in a manner that meets the priorities
established in the adage “Aviate, Navigate, Commu-
nicate”.
3.5 Step 5 - Present Certification case
The NAA is not likely to conduct Step 4. The assess-
ment can be conducted by an NAA-approved third-
party testing organisation. The testing organisation
would issue a report on the outcomes of the assess-
ment, which the UAS Operator could present to the
NAA as part of a case for certification.
Inspiration for the framework proposed in this
paper is taken from the offshore shipping industry,
where a third-party industry dedicated to assess-
ment has assisted the Classification Societies3 to de-
velop regulations for testing of behaviours of on-board
power management systems and ship motion control
systems using hardware in the loop. The services of
the assessment industry can also be used by UAS de-
velopers to obtain feedback on aspects of autonomy
that should be improved. For example, (Perez et al.
2011b) discusses a case where information about such
an evaluation identifies the need to either improve on
fault detection and handling and mission re-planning
or reduce the probability of failure of an actuator.
From the point of view of design, the framework can
suggest areas that may need improvement (for exam-
ple fault-tolerance, mission re-planning and guidance,
or increase the reliability of particular component or
sensor to reduce its failure probability), the actual so-
lution to achieve such improvement is not, however,
the objective of proposed framework.
3.6 Step 6 - The Certification Decision
Given a case presented for certification, the NAA
must make a decision. This decision must be made
under uncertainty since the information provided by
Step 4 is a probability that the system will attain the
required levels of safety and performance, namely (5),
mandated by the class under which the UAS seeks
certification. Note that this is similar to the decision
made as to issuing a licence to a pilot - a decision
under uncertainty.
The NAA is likely to compare the measures of ro-
bust autonomy with threshold probabilities. To aid
in the setting of these thresholds to make such a de-
cision, we can look at normative decision theory (Pe-
terson 2009, Singpurwalla 2006, Berger 1985, Jaynes
2003). In this theory, a decision problem has three
key ingredients:
Π = 〈A,X ,O〉,
where
• A = {A1, A2, . . . , Am} is the set of actions being
considered,
• X = {X1, X2, . . . , Xn} is the set of states of
nature about which there is uncertainty: Pk =
P (Xk),
• O = {Oij}, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, j = 1, 2, . . . , n is the
set outcomes.
3The Classification Societies are entities that develop standards
and issue certificates for design and construction practices as well
as operations of ships and offshore structures. These certificates
are required by insurance companies for insuring vessels.
To solve a decision problem, we require a Loss func-
tion, which quantifies the consequences of the out-
comes. That is the loss function L maps the states
of nature and the actions into numbers that measure
the consequences of the outcomes:
L : Ai, Xj 7→ Lij(Oij).
That is, Lij measures the consequence of taking the
action Ai were Xj be the true state of nature.
A decision can then be made by adopting a De-
cision Criterion, which selects the preferred action
based on the consequences of the outcomes and the
uncertainty of the states of nature:
C : {Lij , Pk} 7→ A?.
For the decision about certification, a simplified de-
cision problem involves a set of a binary actions that
the NAA can make:
A1 - Certify, A2 - Do not certify.
The states of nature of interest can be defined as the
state in which all the performance indices are jointly
satisfied and its complement:
X1 = S1 ∩ S2 ∩ · · · ∩ Sl, X2 = X¯1,
and then
P1 = P (X1) = P (S1, . . . , Sl|D, I),
P2 = P (X2) = 1− P1.
The outcomes are
• O11 - Certifying a UAS that will satisfy the safety
and performance requirements.
• O12 - Certifying a UAS that will not satisfy the
safety and performance requirements.
• O21 - Not certifying a UAS that will satisfy the
safety and performance requirements.
• O22 - Not certifying a UAS that will not satisfy
the safety and performance requirements.
The loss function in terms of the parameters Lij
shown in Table 1. A positive value Lij represents
Table 1: Decision Matrix
X1- Safe X2-Not safe
A1- Certify L11 L12
A2- Do not certify L21 L22
a loss, and a negative value represents a gain or a
reward. For example,
• L11 is a negative number, which reflects the re-
ward for certifying a UAS that satisfies the safety
and performance requirements.
• L12 is a positive number, which reflects a loss for
certifying a UAS that is not safe.
• L21 is a positive number, which reflects a loss for
denying certification to a safe UAS. (L21 is likely
to be less than L12 as it would be a worse to
certify an unreliable UAS compared to denying
certification to a worthy UAS.)
• L22 is a negative number, which reflects the re-
ward for denying certification to an unsafe UAS.
These four numbers and the scale in which they are
measured reflect the the attitude of the NAA (risk
proneness or risk averseness). The determination of
the these numbers is a complex multidisciplinary task
that will require involving not only the NAA, but also
industry, social scientists and other subject matter
specialists.
At the time of making a decision, whether the true
state of nature is X1 or X2 will not be known with
certainty: only their probabilities P1 and P2 will be
known through the calculations made in Step 4. The
decision criterion that satisfies the requirements of
consistency and rationality is that of taking the ac-
tion that minimises the Bayesian risk (Jaynes 2003).
The Bayesian risk is the expected loss over the poste-
rior distribution of the uncertain states of nature at
the time of making the decision (Singpurwalla 2006,
Berger 1985), namely,
A? = arg min
A∈A
EX [L(A,X)],
where EX [·] denotes the expectation operator with re-
spect the distribution of X. That is, the NAA should
take the action that gives the minimum of the two
risks:
ρ(A1) = L11 P1 + L12 P2,
ρ(A2) = L21 P1 + L22 P2.
As discussed by Peterson (2009), the choice of ex-
pected loss as decision criterion is not to be inter-
preted as making the decision that minimises the loss
in average (as if decisions were made several times).
This criterion arises from the satisfaction of axioms of
rationality and consistency, from which it follows that
rational agents making decisions behave as if they
minimise the expected loss.
4 Conclusion
This paper discusses a model of the civil aviation
safety framework and shows how the current assess-
ment of reliability and risk for conventionally piloted
aircraft may not provide an appropriate framework
for the same degree of assurance in the safety of Un-
manned Aircraft Systems (UAS) operations of vary-
ing levels of autonomy. This is because existing ap-
proach does not certify the system as a whole. A new
framework for certifying UAS, based on the princi-
ples of risk management is proposed. This frame-
work arises from combining quantified measures of
risk with a probabilistic assessment and normative
decision making. The decision making requires quan-
tifying probabilities associated with the measures of
risk and also consequences of outcomes related to the
behaviour of an UAS. These probabilities are mea-
sures of uncertainty about the events of satisfactory
safety and performance, and they are computed us-
ing a Bayesian approach from an assessment under
both nominal and anomalous scenarios described by
faults. The framework poses the decision making as
a normative decision problem and solves it in terms
of the minimisation of the expected loss - a criterion
which satisfies the requirements of consistency and
rationality of probability theory.
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